GAO Report Highlights Persistent Challenges in Speeding Up DOD Weapon Systems Development

The GAO's most recent annual review of the Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems finds ongoing obstacles in rapidly delivering sophisticated technologies to the warfighter. Despite plans to expend more than $2 trillion in developing and procuring its most expensive weapon projects, the DOD struggles to field breakthrough technology at the required pace. The research emphasizes the growing complexity of military systems, which is mostly driven by software, and warns that recent changes aimed at accelerating development have not fully realized their objectives.

The evaluation notes that leading commercial enterprises get speedier results through iterative design, development, and manufacturing cycles, which the DOD has yet to completely adopt. According to the GAO, the average major defense acquisition program (MDAP) that has yet to deliver basic capability plans will take more than ten years, which is somewhat longer than the previous year. For programs that have achieved capability, the average time has climbed from eight to eleven years, continuing the trend of longer cycle times.

The research also assesses 20 of the Department of Defense's major middle-tier acquisition (MTA) programs, which are anticipated to cost more than $35 billion. It reveals that five MTA programs indicate delays in demonstrating important capabilities, and the majority do not intend to use leading practices that promote speed. Many applications still use lengthy, linear development schedules rather than the more efficient iterative alternatives.

The GAO notes that, while the DOD has implemented the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, which includes the major capability acquisition and MTA pathways, these frameworks have not meaningfully reduced development times. The MTA pathway, which is intended for rapid prototyping and fielding, has not completely embraced leading iterative development approaches, which could result in speedier capability delivery. According to the survey, most MTA strategies do not specify how they intend to attain fieldable capability within five years, resulting in additional development time after initial prototyping.

The report also discusses the DOD's use of modern software development methodologies. Although more programs report employing agile and iterative methodologies, critical practices such as software factories and modular contracting are still not widely used. The GAO underlines the necessity of conducting early and frequent cybersecurity assessments to detect and address risks without severely disrupting schedules. However, the majority of MDAP and MTA programs studied did not regularly schedule these assessments at the appropriate stages.

The evaluation goes into greater detail about the DOD's software workforce difficulties. Many initiatives rely on contractor-led software development since it is difficult to hire and retain people with adequate experience. The DOD's efforts to develop a cadre of professionals with software knowledge are in their early stages, with little progress made in growing the cadre or defining its objectives. This constraint makes it difficult to provide enough control and expertise to acquisition initiatives.

To address these concerns, the GAO presents several suggestions. It recommends that the DOD better integrate leading product development methods in MTA initiatives, define clear goals for its software cadre, and identify tactics and resources to achieve these objectives. The DOD has partially agreed to these recommendations, agreeing to amend policies to promote effective implementation.

In conclusion, the GAO's yearly assessment of DOD weapon systems indicates continued hurdles in speeding up the development and deployment of new technologies. To increase the speed and effectiveness of DOD procurement processes, the paper recommends wider adoption of iterative development practices, improved software development strategies, and a greater emphasis on cybersecurity and workforce capabilities.

Previous
Previous

New Guidance for Federal Contracting Officer Representatives on CUI handling, Cybersecurity qualifications, and Oversight processes

Next
Next

A Comprehensive Data Protection Approach for Cloud-Native Applications: NIST IR 8505 IPD