The Department of Defense's (DOD) military construction program, which funds projects ranging from childcare centers to key structures such as barracks and hangars, is a large public expenditure. For fiscal year 2025, the DOD has sought more than $15 billion for construction projects. The GAO study identifies serious inadequacies in the program's oversight, particularly in monitoring and documenting lessons learned from ongoing and finished initiatives. These monitoring and reporting deficiencies have resulted in longer project delays, higher costs, and poor planning, all of which might have been prevented with improved oversight systems.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) failure to provide comprehensive project monitoring is at the heart of the problem. While OSD collects data on a small number of high-profile projects, it delegated much of the responsibility for overseeing the majority of military construction projects to Army and Navy construction agents. This reliance on construction agents, combined with poor data collection on project milestones, funds spent, and planning details, creates a gap in the Department of Defense's ability to effectively manage and resolve risks and issues in its building programs. According to the GAO's findings, inadequate early planning, including design flaws, was responsible for almost 25% of project delays that lasted more than one year. Without precise and consistent data from all projects, OSD is unable to do trend analysis or address systemic issues that cause delays and cost increases.

One of the most serious issues identified by the GAO study is inconsistency in the reporting and sharing of lessons gained by Army and Navy construction agents. For example, in one project, a building was delayed for more than three years due to design defects such as inappropriate roof design and insufficient quality control. Despite these significant flaws, Army construction agents did not implement a system to capture lessons gained from this project, which could avoid the same mistakes from being made in future building endeavors. The lack of a uniform system for capturing and sharing project observations across projects restricts the ability to improve processes, decrease delays, and save money.

The GAO emphasizes that the problem is more than simply a failure to identify problems; it is also a failure to systematically capture and share solutions and best practices. For example, the Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) lacks a structured framework for conducting after-action evaluations or lessons learned programs. This inconsistency is visible in projects like NAVFAC's Road Construction and Repair Project at Camp Lejeune, which was delayed owing to design flaws and unforeseen circumstances. Despite this, no formal after-action review was conducted, and the lessons learned were not adequately documented. In another project involving the construction of a communications center at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, design flaws caused substantial delays and cost overruns. Again, NAVFAC failed to undertake an after-action evaluation, resulting in a missed chance to capture critical insights.

These oversight and lessons-learned recording gaps have major effects. Military building projects frequently require sophisticated designs and coordination among various stakeholders. When errors arise in the design of vital infrastructure such as roofs or HVAC systems, the costs of correcting them can be tremendous. Furthermore, delays in building timelines can have far-reaching consequences for military readiness and operations, especially where important infrastructure is involved. The GAO emphasizes that stronger advice, training, and methods for sharing lessons learned could help prevent future mistakes, save resources, and guarantee that projects are completed more efficiently and cost-effectively.

The GAO study makes many recommendations to improve DOD control of military construction programs. One of the key recommendations is that OSD provide instructions requiring project sponsors to report more extensive information about each project, including the DOD construction agent in charge of the project as well as specific planning and design milestones. By gathering more detailed data, OSD would be better able to monitor project progress and manage both specific project obstacles and systemic concerns throughout the construction program.

Another crucial proposal is that the Army and Navy establish formal guidelines and training for documenting and sharing lessons learned from military construction projects. DOD may dramatically improve its ability to prevent future design errors and construction delays by implementing an after-action review system and training all personnel in documenting and sharing project insights. Furthermore, the GAO proposes that the Army Corps of Engineers and NAVFAC establish enterprise-wide processes for sharing lessons learned and best practices. Implementing such technologies would enable improved collaboration and information sharing across projects, lowering the risk of repeat errors and enhancing overall project results.

The report also underlines the need for OSD to take a more aggressive supervision posture. Given the large number of military construction projects that have been delayed owing to poor initial planning, the OSD must take steps to guarantee that it is not only reacting to problems but also recognizing and correcting possible difficulties before they develop. By requiring more relevant information to be reported and doing program-level trend analysis, OSD can help guarantee that military construction projects are performed efficiently, expeditiously, and cost-effectively as possible.